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We outline a general psychological theory of extremism and apply it to the special case of
violent extremism (VE). Extremism is defined as motivated deviance from general behavioral
norms and is assumed to stem from a shift from a balanced satisfaction of basic human needs
afforded by moderation to a motivational imbalance wherein a given need dominates the
others. Because motivational imbalance is difficult to sustain, only few individuals do,
rendering extreme behavior relatively rare, hence deviant. Thus, individual dynamics trans-
late into social patterns wherein majorities of individuals practice moderation, whereas
extremism is the province of the few. Both extremism and moderation require the ability to
successfully carry out the activities that these demand. Ability is partially determined by the
activities’ difficulty, controllable in part by external agents who promote or oppose extrem-
ism. Application of this general framework to VE identifies the specific need that animates
it and offers broad guidelines for addressing this pernicious phenomenon.
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Violent extremism (VE) counts among the most vexing
challenges confronting the world today (Zarif, 2015). Experts
increasingly agree, moreover, that there is no military solution
to this problem, for no matter how many militants are killed or
apprehended, scores of others rush to fill their place (Office of
the Press Secretary, 2014). The perplexing question, therefore,
is what prompts the massive volunteering of young men and
women to violent organizations such as the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Equally important are the questions of
how individuals who have radicalized already can be deradi-
calized and returned to moderation.
In this article, we offer a theory addressed at these issues.
Though important recent work has examined VE (Atran, Axel-
rod, & Davis, 2007; Horgan, 2009; Sageman, 2004; Swann,
Gómez, Seyle, Morales, & Huici, 2009), a number of funda-
mental issues on this topic remain unresolved concerning the
motivational dynamics leading to extremism, the role of ide-
ology in radicalization, the contribution to this phenomenon of
social networks, and the place of personality predispositions in
this process. We approach these issues within a broad analytic
framework that treats VE as a special case of extremism writ
large, distinguished by the unmitigated perpetration of aggres-
sion for a cause. Accordingly, we first discuss the general
phenomenon of extremism as such, and then consider in depth
the special case of VE.
What Extremism Is: Defining the Phenomenon
The term extreme is defined as “exceeding the ordinary,
usual or expected” (Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1986, p. 441).
To be sure, not every behavior that is unusual, or out of the
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ordinary, qualifies as extremist. An individual from a dif-
ferent culture may enact behaviors that are uncommon in a
given setting, or a disabled individual may be prevented
from acting in ways that characterize a majority of people,
without such instances being considered extremist. Rather,
we reserve the term extremism for a willful deviation from
the norms of conduct in a given context or situation. Such
norms describe what most people in a given society would
do in the same circumstances.
According to the present definition, varied types of
behavior are classifiable as extreme. Bungee jumping or
wing-suit flying, for example, are “extreme” because
they entail risks (to health and survival) that relatively
few persons undertake. Anorexic diets are extreme be-
cause they involve acts of self-denial that most people
eschew, and VE encompasses activities (e.g., the killing
of innocents) that deviate from norms of conduct con-
doned in most civilizations and religions. Extreme ac-
tions that most people eschew may occur on the spur of
the moment under the influence of intoxicating sub-
stances. Finally, not all extreme behaviors are violent or
destructive. The humanistic works of Mother Theresa or
of Albert Schweitzer, for instance, represent acts of self-
denial that very few persons venture, which makes them
extreme. In the present article, we cast a broad analytic
net to capture all such diverse types of extraordinary
behavior.
Why Does Extremism Happen?
Any behavior, including its extreme forms, is a function
of two general factors: motivation and ability (Kruglanski et
al., 2012). Motivation represents the internal determinant of
behavior. It contains the factors of value and expectancy
that under proper circumstances translate into a goal (Krug-
lanski et al., 2014), which prompts the selection of a be-
havioral means to its attainment. Ability is the behavior’s
external determinant. It expresses the degree of actual con-
trol an individual has over the behavior in question (Fish-
bein & Ajzen, 2010). In the sections that follow, we con-
sider how motivation and ability determine extreme
behavior in general, and VE in particular.
Motivational Balance and Imbalance
A major determinant of extremism is motivational imbal-
ance, the degree to which a given need comes to dominate
the others. We assume that moderate behaviors, exhibited
by majorities of people, are guided by a set of basic bio-
logical and psychogenic needs (cf. Deci & Ryan, 2000;
Fiske, 2004; Higgins, 2012; Maslow, 1943); these recipro-
cally constrain behaviors enacted on their behalf. In other
words, behaviors that satisfy one need while undermining
another would tend to be avoided. For example, the need for
esteem and admiration may be seen as best served by
heroism in battle, yet concerns for safety and the survival
instinct may prohibit such risky heroics. Because people
generally strive to satisfy their fundamental needs, they tend
to stay within a restricted behavioral range that these con-
strain; this results in the moderate pattern of conduct defin-
ing the behavioral norm displayed by majorities of persons.
In this manner, motivational dynamics at the individual
level translate into social patterns in which majorities of
persons (the “mainstream”) exhibit moderation and minor-
ities (the “fringe”) display extremism.
Psychological Asymmetry of Extremism
and Moderation
Empirical evidence supports the notion that people ex-
hibit a preference for moderation over extremity. For ex-
ample, average stimuli are liked more than extreme ones
(e.g., Halberstadt & Rhodes, 2003), and traits of moderate
intensity are liked better than ones that are very low or very
high (Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, Unkelbach, & Alves, 2016).
Our motivational-imbalance assumption, whereby extrem-
ism involves partial oblivion to individuals’ fundamental
needs, explains not only why extreme behaviors are exhib-
ited by a minority of people but also why extremism tends
to be short lived, relatively speaking, though different “ex-
tremisms” vary on the temporal scale of their duration. For
example, membership in militant far-right organizations
lasts on the average of 10 years (Bjorgo, 2002), the pursuit
of criminal lifestyle is typically brief (Ridgeway, 2014), and
revolutions often lead to counterrevolutions and end up with
a “domestication” of erstwhile revolutionaries. Thus, there
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218 KRUGLANSKI, JASKO, CHERNIKOVA, DUGAS, AND WEBBER
exists an asymmetry between extremism and moderation, in
that the latter is more appealing overall and psychologically
easier to sustain than the former.
How Extremism Starts and How It Ends
Triggering Motivational Imbalance
For most persons, the initial point of departure is the
mainstream. No one is born a revolutionary, a terrorist, or an
extreme dieter. To become an extremist, something must
transpire along the way to trigger the motivational imbal-
ance that induces deviance. This may take place when
persons realize on their own or are persuaded by others that
their important need has been neglected, and that an oppor-
tunity presents itself to gratify it. Addressing the need in
question may then assume high priority, overshadow other
considerations, and allow the contemplation of extreme
behavior. For instance, under intense hunger, individuals
may carry out such counternormative acts as scavenging for
food, stealing, or eating substances or articles considered
disgusting or inedible.
Often, the frustrated need is social in nature. For instance,
when frustrated, the need for love and relatedness
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995) may drive individuals to so
called “crimes of passion” in violation of societal norms and
legal codes (Baumeister, Brewer, Tice, & Twenge, 2007).
The desire to appeal to potential mates may promote the
adoption of an extreme diet aimed to improve one’s appear-
ance, and so forth.
Extremism is a matter of degree, defined by the extent of
motivational imbalance among individuals’ basic needs.
Where a given focal need looms considerably larger than its
alternatives (vs. less so), it affords greater freedom from
their constraints (Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach, & Kruglanski,
2011). In turn, liberation from constraints permits extreme
behaviors that would be prohibited otherwise. For instance,
volunteering to help out in a soup kitchen in order to feel
good about oneself or making a monetary contribution to
charity are less extreme than volunteering for the Peace
Corps or devoting one’s life to the poor. Simply, the former
behaviors entail more limited degrees of self-sacrifice that
allows also addressing one’s selfish concerns (one’s career,
comfort, social relationships, or leisure).
Restoring Motivational Balance
The opposite journey, back to moderation, is prompted by
the same general factors (albeit in reverse) that produced the
shift to the extreme in the first place. Just as the motiva-
tional imbalance underlies a fringe-bound shift, restored
motivational balance underlies abandonment of the fringe
and a reversion to the mainstream. Such balance restoration
may happen through weakening of a once-dominant need,
the strengthening of alternative concerns, and/or a realiza-
tion that the extreme means does not serve the dominant
need the way it was supposed to. For instance, a change in
one’s life’s circumstances (e.g., marriage, family) might
reduce one’s concern about sexy appearance presumably
served by an extreme diet. Also, one’s overriding need for
achievement may give way to concern about one’s health if
one was diagnosed with a life-threatening illness.
Cognitive representations and the role of narratives.
Goals and means are cognitively represented (Fishbach &
Ferguson, 2007; Kruglanski, 1996). Activation of the rele-
vant cognitions may happen in various ways. Occasionally,
one may form a goal–means schema on one’s own based on
one’s independent experience and assessment; more typi-
cally, such a schema is contained in a culturally approved
narrative (or ideology) to which individuals have been ex-
posed, and that they have internalized. A narrative that
privileges one type of value (e.g., money) over competing
values can induce the commitment to extreme behavior
because it selectively activates certain goals while neglect-
ing others. Similarly, the shift back to motivational balance
might be based on one’s own inferential process, but also on
sociocultural narratives that advocate moderation. For in-
stance, narratives that highlight the complexity of a value
system (e.g., advocating work–life balance) may decrease
the appeal of extreme behavior and restore moderation.
Research by Tetlock (1984, 1986) has confirmed that mod-
erate ideology was associated with a perception of multiple
values as approximately equally important, whereas ideo-
logical extremism was associated with one value dominat-
ing over others.
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219VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEVIANCE
The twin functions of social networks. Another factor
that may contribute to initiation and maintenance of extreme
behavior in service of a goal is social network. Social
networks fulfill two motivationally relevant functions for
their members: informational and normative (cf. Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955; Kelley, 1952). The informational function
consists of validating a given goal–means schema as worthy
of adopting. The normative function consists of rewarding
individuals for enacting the schema-implied behavior.
Informational influence. The networks’ informational
influence consists of serving an epistemic authority whose
consensual support validates a given narrative (Hardin &
Higgins, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2005). Agreement of one’s
respected peers with its content is taken as evidence of its
veracity, as does the charisma, credibility, and perceived
expertise of a communicator who delivers the narrative. Just
like extremist narratives, those that promote moderation
often derive their persuasive power from the epistemic
authority of their source, including the network of signifi-
cant others whom the individual holds in high regard. Thus,
a new friendship network may curb individuals’ enthusiasm
for extreme means and encourage them to embark on a
renewed pursuit of mainstream activities. Similarly, extri-
cation from the extremist network may facilitate leaving
extremism behind, just as immersion in that network may
have previously fostered a movement to the fringe.
It is noteworthy that the support of social networks or
validation of given narratives by credible communicators,
although often helpful in inducing a given motivational
state, is not essential for that purpose. Specifically, individ-
uals with high confidence in their own judgment, or with
high self-ascribed epistemic authority, may not depend as
much on others for validation of their goals and means; they
are less impacted by social networks and persuasive com-
municators, as they feel confident in their own assessment
and are in no need of external validation (Kruglanski et al.,
2005).
Normative influence. A social network’s normative in-
fluence resides in its power to reward the individual for
subscribing to network-espoused goal–means schema and
implementing the activities that it suggests. Such rewards
may consist of bestowal upon the individual of the group’s
approval and according them the status and acceptance that
approval begets.
The role of ability. Beyond the motivation to carry out
extreme behavior in service of a predominant need, indi-
viduals must have the ability to do so. Ability has two
aspects: subjective and objective. The subjective aspect has
to do with the individual’s expectancy to be able to carry out
the (extreme) activities, that is, to implement the goal–
means schema in the prescribed manner. In psychological
models of motivation (Atkinson, 1964; Kruglanski, 1996;
Kruglanski et al., 2014; Lewin, 1951), expectancy (attain-
ability) combines with value (desirability) to determine the
readiness to initiate goal-driven behavior. However,
whereas subjective ability determines the initiation of an
activity, its completion will not take place without objective
ability to see it through. For instance, some persons may
suffer physical limitations that preclude their pursuit of an
extreme behavior that is physically taxing, or they may lack
the required know-how for such pursuit—for instance, the
military training required of a revolutionary fighter. Al-
though existing research suggests that a reduction of indi-
viduals’ energetic resources reduces their ability to control
their urges and increases their vulnerability to temptations
of various kinds (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, &
Tice, 1998; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), including im-
pulses to carry out extreme, socially unacceptable behav-
iors, the ability to maintain such extreme commitment most
likely demands a high rather than low level of energetic
resources.
Ability may also play a significant role in individuals’
return to the mainstream. To leave the fringe behind, one
may require the resolve and willpower to withstand the
group pressure that often binds one to the extremist “attrac-
tor,” and/or the competence to satisfy one’s fundamental
needs in the balanced ways prescribed by the mainstream.
Thus, in order to be reintegrated into the society, a criminal
may need to receive the appropriate vocational training and
education, the drug addict may need to learn to subjugate
her or his destructive habit, and the extreme dieter may need
to acquire novel eating habits.
Distinct roles of motivation and ability. We finally
assume that motivation and ability play distinct roles in
extreme behavior. The degree of motivational imbalance
determines the degree of extremism to which the individual
Marina
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220 KRUGLANSKI, JASKO, CHERNIKOVA, DUGAS, AND WEBBER
may be ready to commit. In this sense, it sets an upper
bound on potential extremism. In contrast, ability deter-
mines whether the individual is capable of reaching that
upper point on the extremism continuum. Absent such an
ability, people may need to resort to less extreme activities
of which they are capable. Consider an individual who lacks
the ability to pursue an extreme sport she/he is passionate
about. In those circumstances, that person might instead
become an extreme fan of a team in that athletic discipline,
collect clippings about its champions and history, and so
forth.
Personality predispositions. The process of initiating
and maintaining a motivational imbalance or balance may
be influenced by a host of stable individual differences. For
instance, individuals who are chronically high on a given
need (e.g., need for achievement, social approval, sensation
seeking) should be predisposed to privilege it over others.
Other personality factors may prompt persons to yield to the
impetus to emit extreme behavior whenever it occurs. Peo-
ple high in the need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 2004)
have been known to “seize and freeze” on accessible no-
tions and to eschew weighing their alternatives. Thus, they
may be more prone to remain committed to a focal goal
even when it happens at the expense of other goals (Shah,
Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002). Highly acquiescent indi-
viduals may be more readily convinced than others by
extremism-promoting narratives and networks, whereas in-
dividuals with a strong predisposition toward uniqueness
may be more prepared than others to break out of the
mainstream and explore the fringe regardless of social sup-
port (Imhoff & Erb, 2009). Of special relevance, Valler-
and’s (2015) distinction between individuals who are ob-
sessive versus harmonious in their passion for a given
pursuit directly taps a personality predisposition toward
motivational imbalance versus balance, respectively. In-
deed, a recent study by Bélanger, Lafrenière, Vallerand, and
Kruglanski (2013) found that obsessively passionate indi-
viduals were significantly more likely than harmoniously
passionate individuals to select extreme means relevant to
their passion.
Some personality traits may be relevant to the initiation of
extreme behavior, but not necessarily to its maintenance.
For instance, although impulsive individuals may act with-
out much hesitation on their temporarily dominant need, it
is unlikely that they will be able to maintain their commit-
ment for very long. The same should be true of other
psychological variables associated with impulsive behavior,
such as low self-control (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone,
2004) or low conscientiousness (Costa & McCrae, 1992),
which may lead to increased appeal of extreme activities,
but not necessarily to their maintenance.
In summary, the movement away from the mainstream
and toward the fringe requires a shift toward a motivational
imbalance wherein a given need dominates the others, and
an extreme behavior is identified as the means of choice for
satisfying that need. In addition to the motivational imbal-
ance, extremism also requires an ability to carry out such
deviant behavior. Similarly, the movement back to moder-
ation requires a shift toward motivational balance and an
ability to sustain such balance via appropriate activities.
Next, we apply the analysis of extremism as a general
phenomenon to the specific case of VE.
Violent Extremism
The common features that VE shares with other forms of
extremism are the shift toward motivational imbalance and
the ability to sustain the extreme means to the dominant
need. The features that characterize VE uniquely concern
the specific need that animates it, and the use of violence as
the extreme means for gratifying that need.
Shift Toward Motivational Imbalance
Quest for significance. Earlier we posited that the
move toward extremism is occasioned by a motivational
shift in which a given need becomes dominant and trumps
other common concerns. What might this need be in the
case of VE? A considerable number of motivations relevant
to VE have been identified in the literature (such as honor,
vengeance, religion, loyalty to the leader, perks in the af-
terlife, feminism; e.g., Bloom, 2005; Stern, 2004). All of
these are entirely appropriate descriptions of specific cases.
But underlying them, there seems to exist a more general
motivating force that we label the quest for significance.
This is the fundamental desire to matter, to be someone, to
Michelle Dugas
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221VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEVIANCE
merit respect (Kruglanski et al., 2013; Kruglanski, Chen,
Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009; Kruglanski et al.,
2014). Psychological theorists have long realized that this
quest constitutes a universal, human motivation variously
labeled as the need for esteem, achievement, meaning, and
control (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Frankl, 1969; Higgins, 2012;
Maslow, 1943).
Triggering the significance quest. A major way to
arouse a motivation is through deprivation of a need. Ac-
cordingly, the need for significance may be aroused via a
perceived loss of significance, that is, through significance
deprivation. Significance loss can sometimes happen due to
individual humiliation, unrelated to any intergroup conflict.
This is illustrated by cases of Palestinian women who vol-
unteered for suicide missions after they had suffered a
stigma in their personal lives (e.g., infertility, disfiguration,
or allegation of an extramarital affair or divorce; Pedahzur,
2005). But humiliation can also arise in the context of
intergroup conflict and result from personal losses perpe-
trated by the enemy. For instance, the Chechen “black
widows” were rendered powerless, and thus were demeaned
and humiliated by having their loved ones wrested from
them by the Russian forces (Speckhard & Paz, 2012). Often,
significance loss can stem from an affront to one’s social
identity. For instance, Muslim immigrants in Europe who
encounter widespread “Islamophobia” on the part of native
Europeans (Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post, & Victoroff, 2008;
Sageman, 2004) may pervasively experience this kind of
“put down.” Discrimination against one’s group and tram-
pling of its sacred values (Atran et al., 2007) engenders a
considerable significance loss by members of the group
(e.g., all Muslims); this is often skillfully exploited by the
propagandists of Al Qaeda and ISIS, for example.
Often, motivational priming stems from a perceived op-
portunity to gratify the motive in question (Shah & Krug-
lanski, 2003). The pursuit of violence and self-sacrifice can
be portrayed as an opportunity for a vast significance gain,
a place in history, and the status of hero or martyr (Post,
2006). Significance loss or threat of loss may be intertwined
with the opportunity for significance gain through attempts
to eradicate or prevents the loss. Thus, humiliation of one’s
group offers the possibility to strike back at the culprits,
therefore leveling the playing field and demonstrating one’s
power and, hence, significance.
Willingness to use extreme means. The motivational
shift toward the quest for significance entails the relative
suppression of alternative, common concerns. This liberates
individuals to use whatever means they perceive as effective
to satisfying their dominant need, regardless of how extreme
these might be. Research by Dugas et al. (2016) found that
the experience of significance loss was related to expressed
readiness to suffer pain and to sacrifice one’s comfort for a
significance-lending cause. Relatedly, research on sacred
values repeatedly demonstrated that individuals were pre-
pared to sacrifice material benefits on the altar of such
values, which protection bestows the aura of significance on
individuals (Atran et al., 2007).
Note that, in and of itself, the quest of significance does
not necessarily promote violence as the means of choice.
After all, some means to significance are quite socially
accepted, namely, (a) moderate ones compatible with other
common concerns, (b) extreme ones compatible with social
norms, and (c) extreme ones that in fact serve major moral
imperatives. In the category of moderate means belong
routes to significance via the pursuit of excellence and
achievements in various socially applauded domains such as
science, art, and business. In the second category belong
activities like extreme diets and extreme sports that involve
self-denial that does not contradict important societal in-
junctions. Finally, in the third category belong self-
sacrificial activities (e.g., those of missionaries and other
humanitarians) that are venerated by the mainstream be-
cause they in fact serve cherished values. Nonetheless, as
shown in the following section, violence appears to consti-
tute a particularly common means to significance gain.
Violence as means to significance. There is something
special about violence as a possible means to significance.
It constitutes the primordial, raw, and direct use of power,
inflicting hurtful costs on the targets of one’s aggression
(Raven, 1993). Violence is the “great equalizer” capable of
obliterating the significance of venerated individuals and
turning them into disempowered victims. It is through vio-
lence or threatened violence that conflicts in the animal
kingdom are typically resolved, and pecking order in animal
hierarchies are established (Buss & Shackelford, 1997). To
David Webber
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a large extent, the potential for violence (i.e., military
might) also determines the standing (hence, significance) of
nations in the world arena.
Ample empirical evidence suggests that violence is often
employed in the effort to restore one’s compromised signif-
icance. Case studies of 15 school shootings show that they
often occurred in response to social rejection (Leary, Ko-
walski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003). In our own work, we have
found that significance loss leads to the adoption of ex-
treme, group-oriented ideology and the support for vio-
lence; this has been shown in culturally diverse samples,
including American respondents, Muslims in Spain and the
Philippines, and Tamils in Sri Lanka (Webber et al., 2016).
In a sample of ideological extremists in the United States,
we found that those who experienced abuse, social rejec-
tion, or failure were more likely to resort to ideologically
directed violence (Jasko, LaFree, & Kruglanski, 2016).
Analyses of the motivational patterns of suicide attackers
revealed that the degree of violence in an attack was corre-
lated with indicators of the attacker’s motivation to gain
significance (Webber, Klein, Kruglanski, Brizi, & Merari,
2015). Similarly, perceiving oneself as victim of anti-
Muslim discrimination was associated with support for sui-
cide bombing in Muslim diaspora populations (Victoroff,
Adelman, & Matthews, 2012), and economic discrimination
against minorities has been found to be a substantive pre-
dictor of domestic terrorism (Piazza, 2011).
These various examples show that many instances of
significance loss are perceived as result of other people’s
actions. In such situations, when there is a clear target to
blame for the experienced injustice, violence may be per-
ceived as an appealing means with which to redress the
undeserved harm. Indeed, analyses of violent acts have
shown that their preponderance can be attributed to motives
that—from the perspective of the perpetrator—are reactions
to perceived unfairness that foster significance loss for the
victims (Baumeister, 1999; Stillwell, Baumeister, & Del
Priore, 2008). The determination to use violence in such
situations might also serve to protect one from a future loss
(Nowak, Gelfand, Borkowski, Cohen, & Hernandez, 2016),
thus offering valuable deterrence as bulwark against future
humiliations.
To be sure, the use of violence has a serious drawback as
well. It runs afoul of societal norms common in most
civilizations that expressly prohibit violence; such prohibi-
tions recognize the destructive potential of violence and its
propensity to undermine the social order in the long run
(Freud, 1930/1991; Pinker, 2012). In light of the pervasive
injunctions against violence, its use by individuals and
societies calls for special justification. The two factors re-
viewed next—ideological narratives and social networks—
are particularly common sources of such justification.
Ideological narratives. By highlighting the discrep-
ancy between the imperfect present and the utopian future
(Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009), an ideological narrative
sustains the motivational imbalance that drives extreme
actions. Because it depicts the cause in terms of grand and
far-reaching goals (e.g., “Liberté, égalité, fraternité”), be-
havior in service of those goals is no longer influenced by a
cost-benefit analysis (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki,
2007) simply because the awoken quest for significance
renders such costs irrelevant.
In addition to invoking a supreme, significance-
promoting goal, an ideological narrative delineates a set of
legitimate means to pursue it. By creating an association
between an important goal and violent means, extremist
ideologies facilitate translating motivation into action, be-
cause they significantly reduce the difficulty of coming up
with a specific plan to pursue the cause (Gollwitzer, 1999).
One example of such a strong goal–means association is
found in culture of honor narratives (Nisbett & Cohen,
1996), whereby affronts must be countered with aggression
against one’s detractors. Research confirms that culture-of-
honor states have more aggressive acts than non-culture-of-
honor states (Brown, Osterman, & Barnes, 2009).
Finally, by identifying the culprits responsible for the
unacceptable current state and depicting them as immoral
and contemptible, ideological narratives eliminate another
important constraint on violence: empathetic concern for the
suffering of others. Two justificatory themes relevant to this
strategy are particularly prevalent: (a) those based on em-
ployment of in-group/purity morality (Haidt & Graham,
2006), and (b) those based on the dehumanization of the
intended targets of one’s violence. The concept of in-group
morality refers to the belief that whatever serves the group’s
interest is moral and ethically warranted (Haidt & Graham,
2006). In this manner, Islamic VE has stressed the notion
that the West has been actively assaulting Islam and vying
to eradicate it, and that, therefore, attacks against Western-
ers are morally justified and commanded by Allah (Al-
Adnani, 2015). Moreover, justification of violence against
civilians typically employs a language that delegitimizes
them (Bandura, 1999), often by denying them human prop-
erties and portraying them as disgusting infrahuman crea-
tures (e.g., cockroaches, rats, pigs, or apes) that do not merit
the consideration generally extended to humans (Castano &
Giner-Sorolla, 2006).
The role of social networks. Radical social networks
can influence the intention to engage in violence by vali-
dating the importance of the goal and confirming that a
violent means is an appropriate way to pursue it. Moreover,
when important others are willing to engage in violent acts,
they create a local norm, whereby violence is commendable,
and its pursuit is rewarded by the group’s esteem and
reverence. Empirical research has confirmed that when a
violent act is socially validated, people experience less guilt
and distress than when it is questioned by important others
(Webber, Schimel, Martens, Hayes, & Faucher, 2013). Fi-
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nally, by offering significance and acceptance, belonging to
a group may become an end in itself, and thus increase
members’ willingness to undergo sacrifices for a collective
cause (Willer, 2009). Empirical research by Swann and
colleagues attests to the notion that when the group consti-
tutes an important part of the self-concept, individuals are
more likely to engage in extreme pro-group behaviors (e.g.,
Swann, Gómez, Dovidio, Hart, & Jetten, 2010; Swann et al.,
2009).
Note that validation of a justificatory narrative by a social
network may not be absolutely essential for sustaining in-
dividuals’ commitment to extreme violence. Some individ-
uals may have such a strong sense of their own epistemic
authority that they do not require concrete validation of
their views by others; furthermore, they may have such a
confident sense of self that they have little need for others’
approval. Ted Kaczynski, the infamous Unabomber (Ency-
clopedia Britannica, n.d.) was a loner who spun his justifi-
catory narrative for violence on his own (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2008). Similarly, Anders Breivik, the Norwe-
gian who killed 77 persons in Oslo and on the island of
Utoya in 2011 had no concrete network of social support
and constructed his own justificatory narrative for the mas-
sacre (Knausgaard, 2016). Finally, the recent spate of “lone
wolf” attacks in Israel, Europe, and the United States (Oli-
phant, 2016) suggest that the Internet and social media may
serve the function of (virtual) social networks by inducing
and validating individuals’ notions concerning the relative
importance of specific goals (e.g., earning glory by fighting
for a given cause) and the appropriateness of the extreme
means for their pursuit.
Role of Ability in Turning to Extremism
Skill. VE on behalf of an ideological cause may require
corresponding competencies and abilities. For instance, par-
ticipation of foreign fighters in the ongoing struggle in Syria
and Iraq requires the ability to reach those locations and
circumvent tight travel bans designed to stem the flow of
recruits to the militant organizations. Over the years, the
Islamist organizations ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra have man-
aged to set up effective smuggling networks that facilitate
travel of their would-be volunteers, even as states in- and
outside the region have increased their efforts to tighten
travel restrictions (Schmitt & Sengupta, 2015).
Targeting policies of extremist organizations also deter-
mine the level of difficulty that the required activities entail;
this has direct implications for the ability level needed to
carry them out. Whereas the original targeting policy of Al
Qaeda involved high-profile objects such as the World
Trade Center, the Pentagon, the USS Cole, or the U.S.
embassies in Africa, the ISIS policy of inspiring attacks
with minimal means (like hatchets, vehicles, or knives) and
unleashed against anyone anywhere has made the acts of
extremism considerably easier and less demanding.
Energy. Leaving the comfort zone of the mainstream
and embarking on risky extremism requires considerable
zest and energy. Indeed, in general, violent extremists tend
to be young and energetic. An analysis of 350 known
terrorists from Middle Eastern, Latin American, West Eu-
ropean, and Japanese groups revealed that the “composite
terrorist” is a single male in his early 20s (Russell & Miller,
1977). Other terrorist groups reveal similar patterns (Gu-
naratna, 2000; Ergil, 2000). It is difficult to isolate the
variable of energy from the multiple factors correlated with
age; nonetheless, given the challenges of VE, it seems
plausible that youthful vigor and attendant optimism play a
significant part in the relation between age and VE.
Entitlement. Finally, deviation from mainstream norms
is easier for individuals with status and power, who often
feel entitled to stray from the accepted patterns of behavior.
Indeed, experimental studies suggest that when combined
with frustration, a sense of one’s own power increases the
likelihood of aggressive behavior (Fast & Chen, 2009).
Back to Moderation
Restoring motivational balance. Moving toward or
away from VE are mirror images of each other, whether one
or the other occurs depends on the field of driving and
restraining psychological forces promoting extremism or
moderation (Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014; Krug-
lanski et al., 2012). The allure of alternative means to
significance and the relinquishment of VE may be prompted
by the satisfaction of need for significance or resurfacing of
alternative needs, such as those for affection, comfort,
safety, and hedonic enjoyment that may have been sup-
pressed to an appreciable extent during the individuals’
active engagement in VE.
Case studies suggest that as extremists enter their 30s,
front-line activism begins to feel forced and uncomfortable,
especially once individuals have begun to seriously miss
things such as a career, family, and a secure place to live
(Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Reinares, 2011). In addition, ide-
ological justification for violence might “wear thin” in some
cases, and individuals may be swamped by guilt about the
mayhem they have perpetrated (e.g., Bubolz & Simi, 2015).
All of these attest to different ways in which a motivational
recalibration may take place and prompt individuals to
abandon VE.
Alternative means to significance. There is evidence
that relinquishment of VE is related to a shift in the indi-
vidual’s perception, whereby extremism no longer affords
significance and/or alternative means to significance be-
come available that seem superior to extremism. Illustrating
the former process are numerous cases of exit from right-
wing extremist groups, prompted by individuals’ growing
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sense that life in the violent organization, far from the
idealistic picture that the ideological narrative had painted,
is rife with intrigue, back stabbing, and mutual suspicion
(Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Similarly, some foreign fighters
who joined the “holy war” in Iraq and Syria found out that
they were reduced to menial tasks such as cleaning the
toilets, while also being treated with disrespect by ranking
ISIS members (Tomlinson, 2014). A different road to sig-
nificance is through a newly afforded opportunity for em-
ployment, affording the touted “dignity of work”; indeed,
research found that participants in a terrorist rehabilitation
program were more likely to disengage from terrorism if
they were provided with such an opportunity (Abuza, 2009)
or if they realized that their activist involvement jeopardized
their ability to land or maintain certain types of jobs (Simi
& Futrell, 2009).
The luster of violent struggle—hence, its efficacy as a
means to significance—may be dimmed by defeat and the
abject failure of aggression to bestow glory on its perpetra-
tors. For instance, the significant decline in support for the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which we ob-
served in an extensive survey carried out with samples of
former LTTE members (cf. Kruglanski et al., 2014; Webber
et al., 2016), could be partially explained by the 2009 defeat
of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan military. This effectively
eliminated the option of continued struggle and the hope of
a significance-enhancing victory.
Cognitive change and the role of narratives and
networks. Increased loyalty to a different group (Demant
& de Graaf, 2010) or embracement of a different cause that
rejects violence, induces individuals to disengage from a
terrorist group (Reinares, 2011). Realization that the ex-
treme activity fails to satisfy one’s quest for significance or
a substitution of a univalent ideology by a narrative that
embraces plural values (Tetlock, 1986) involves a change in
the individual’s beliefs. Such change is occasionally insti-
gated by individual’s own reflections; often, however, it is
carried by explicit counternarratives to which the extremist
is exposed. A major component of terrorist deradicalization
programs in Saudi Arabia, Singapore, or Iraq have been
dialogues with imams and ulama (Islamic scholars) de-
signed to convince detainees that their violent pursuits are
contrary to the teachings of Islam (El-Said & Harrington,
2010). The ultimate effectiveness of these programs in
changing detainees’ beliefs about the legitimacy of violence
has yet to be determined; nonetheless, the fact that thou-
sands of their graduates were released into society implies
that, at least in the organizers’ judgments, they no longer
posed acute danger (Angell & Gunaratna, 2012; El-Said &
Harrington, 2010).
Reframing extremists’ views about the justifiability of
violence is often carried out by social networks that espouse
contrary views on these matters. A significant role in this
regard is played by the detainees’ families. Families often
oppose their relatives’ involvement in extremism and are
natural allies in the struggle for their deradicalization
(Koehler, 2013). Recruitment of families to the deradical-
ization effort has been a staple of the Saudi and the Singa-
porean rehabilitation programs (Al-Hadlaq, 2011; El-Said
& Harrington, 2010; Gunaratna & Hassan, 2015). In the
Saudi case, for example, families are entrusted with respon-
sibility for the released detainee and cooperation with the
government as to prevention of their reconnection with their
extremist ex-comrades (Al-Hadlaq, 2011).
Role of Ability in Returning to Moderation
Skill. A return to the motivational balance of the main-
stream requires the ability to gratify one’s various needs in
conventionally approved ways. Often, this necessitates the
acquisition of a new skill set that would allow individuals to
reintegrate into the mainstream society and become re-
spected members of their community. An important aspect
of various deradicalization programs, such as those in Saudi
Arabia (Al-Hadlaq, 2011), Singapore (Gunaratna & Hassan,
2015), or Sri Lanka (Webber et al., 2016), was the provision
of such skill sets via vocational education courses, general
education courses, and language training.
Energy. The considerable demands of life on the fringe
may reduce individuals’ ability to sustain it for long (Aho,
1988; Horgan, 2009). Indeed, evidence suggests that the
role of exhaustion as a consequence of engaging in violent
behavior is an important facet of the exit process (Gallant,
2014). Declining energies may also partially explain why
growing older appears to be an important predictor of the
relinquishment of violent activism (Dalgaard-Nielsen,
2013).
Entitlement. To overcome the apprehensions that exit-
ing the fringe may involve may require considerable per-
sonal confidence and fortitude. Such characteristics may
characterize people in leadership positions, and with a sense
of power and independence. In the same way that status and
power enable individuals to initiate a violent movement that
deviates from the mainstream, it may also enable them to
return to moderation. The spontaneous 1997 deradicaliza-
tion of the Egyptian Gammah Islamiyah, and the 2007
partial deradicalization of the Egyptian Al Jihad organiza-
tion, were both initiated by the movements’ leaders, as was
the Armee Islamique du Salud deradicalization in Algier
(Ashour, 2008).
To be sure, high-powered persons within a violent orga-
nization might be particularly unmotivated to carry out a
policy reversal toward moderation for fear of losing status
and being criticized for inconsistency and poor judgment.
Yet should they decide to do so, they may be more capable
of promoting a general deradicalization than individuals
with lesser standing.
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Personality characteristics. Individuals may vary in
their sensitivity to affronts or rejections (Downey & Feld-
man, 1996) and, hence, to the extent to which their signif-
icance quest is aroused by perceived insults or discrimina-
tions. In that regard, rejection-sensitive (vs. less sensitive)
individuals may be more prone to radicalization than ones
who are less rejection-sensitive. Similarly, some individuals
may be more attuned to a militant organization’s narrative.
Because the latter is typically cast in categorical “black
versus white” (us vs. them) terms, individuals who are high
on the need for cognitive closure may find such ideologies
more appealing and, hence, are more likely to radicalize
than individuals who are low on the need for closure (Web-
ber et al., 2016). Finally, individuals who are dependent or
conformist may be more attuned to the network pressures
toward radicalization than individuals who are independent
and nonconformists (Merari, 2010). Thus, even though
there may not be a unique personality profile that charac-
terizes violent extremists prone to volunteer to extremist
organizations, certain individual characteristics relevant to
determinants of the radicalization process may certainly
contribute to those persons’ likelihood of radicalizing under
the proper circumstances.
Recapitulation and Conclusion
The Present Theory
Because of its striking real-world manifestations, it is
tempting to treat VE as a “one of a kind” phenomenon that
is qualitatively distinct from other behavioral occurrences.
But even though its specific combination of features is
unique, VE shares significant psychological dynamics with
other extremisms. Identifying those commonalities offers a
general perspective on VE and promises new insights into
its determinants. From the present perspective, extremism
writ large has two fundamental components pertaining to
motivation and ability, respectively. The motivational com-
ponent is essential and unique to extremism. It involves a
motivational imbalance in which a given need becomes
dominant and suppresses other concerns. This removes the
constraints that the latter typically impose on behavior and
allows extreme actions to be contemplated as possible
means to one’s goals. For those behavioral means to be
actually enacted, however, the individual must have the
appropriate ability. In its objective sense, ability is related to
the actual difficulty of carrying out the extreme activities,
which, in turn, is significantly affected by staunch resistance
to extremism by individuals and groups. The degree of
motivational imbalance determines how far individuals are
prepared to go on the extremism dimension. The ability
component, in contrast, determines what degree of extrem-
ism is actionable, given the individual’s competencies. In
contrast to extremism, moderation is produced by a moti-
vational balance in which individuals attend to their varied
needs and select behaviors compatible with the constraints
these impose.
Applying the foregoing general analysis to VE involved
identifying the dominant motivation that undergirds its pur-
suit. Conceptual analysis, buttressed by empirical research
(cf. Kruglanski et al., 2009, 2014; Webber et al., 2016),
assigns this role to the quest for personal significance, and
the desire to matter and to be recognized. The way of
addressing the quest for significance (e.g., via violence) is
cognitively represented in a goal–means narrative and ap-
propriately validated. Some individuals construct their own
narrative that they hold as valid. More typically, the relevant
narratives are available in individuals’ social environments
(e.g., in social media, blogs, and chat rooms) and are sup-
ported by these persons’ networks. Moreover, formation of
extremist or moderate mind-sets is affected by a host of
personality variables related, for instance, to individuals’
tendency to prioritize momentarily salient needs over other
concerns, susceptibility to persuasion, energy levels, and
autonomy versus dependence. Whereas the motivational
imbalance or balance and the ability to pursue those behav-
iorally are essential for development of the extremist and
moderate mind-sets, their multiple determinants may par-
tially substitute for each other so that none of them is
completely necessary for their emergence. Our theoretical
model is presented in Figure 1.
Alternative Approaches
In recent decades, social scientists have approached the
issue of VE from diverse angles. A well-known attempt
grounds the VE in such root causes as poverty, political
repression, poor education (e.g., Fearon & Laitin, 2003;
Kennedy, 1998), or relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970). A
different approach offers psychological models of VE that
explain it in terms of personality characteristics such as
narcissism (Crayton, 1983), paranoia (e.g., Robins & Post,
1997), or authoritarianism (e.g., Ferracuti & Bruno, 1981).
The rational actor model purports to explain VE in terms of
a calculus of costs and benefits that accrue from extremism
Figure 1. Model of underpinnings of violent extremism.
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versus moderation (e.g., Crenshaw, 1990; Enders & Su,
2007; Perry, Berrebi, Brown, Hollywood, & Jaycocks,
2013). Social movement theory (della Porta, 2013) de-
scribes VE in terms of an unfolding processes of escalating
policing, competitive escalation, and militancy. Finally, so-
cial network theory espouses the idea that radicalization and
collective political action are intimately related to people’s
interpersonal relationships and connections to others com-
mitted to a violent ideology (e.g., Dean, 2007; Sageman,
2004).
Those various approaches to extremism share important
elements in common with our analysis; in that sense, we
build on past insights and “connects the dots” contributed
by other scholars. Importantly, however, the present model
offers a broader and more integrative conception than those
of its predecessors. For instance, whereas some prior theo-
ries (the psychological models) focused on problematic
personality development reducing individuals’ sense of self-
worth, we view developmental issues as one among several
possible sources of feelings of humiliation and insignifi-
cance. Also, whereas some prior models highlighted one
element in particular (e.g., the network element, the person-
ality element, or the ideological element), the present model
outlines how these different elements interact and come
together. Thus, rational actor (cost–benefit) models address
a motivational component without identifying the specific
motivation underlying VE, and they do not relate it to the
network or the ideological components as they may interact
in promoting extremism. The root cause models specify
conditions that might, under some conditions, lead to feel-
ings of injustice and unfairness (cf. Gurr, 1970) without
identifying the linkage of such feelings (of significance
loss) or to the means of violence identified in a justifying
narrative.
The present framework offers a general blueprint con-
cerning possible interventions aimed to counteract or
prevent VE. It suggests that (a) alternative, equally com-
pelling means to significance must be identified and made
available to radicalized individuals or those at risk for radical-
ization, (b) relevant social support against radicalization needs
to be generated, (c) compelling counternarratives against the
violence–significance link need to be generated, and (d) the
ability of individuals to perpetrate violence for their cause must
be thwarted by state policies (e.g., travel restrictions, elimina-
tion of funding sources) and military/policing actions aimed at
defeating the extremists and causing them to fail.
Obviously, these general principles need to be carefully
translated into specific policies and best practices in accor-
dance with specific contexts of their application. Such trans-
lation should take into account whether a given project
involves the deradicalization of committed extremists or a
preventive counterradicalization for those at risk of suc-
cumbing to VE. Specific implementation of the general
principles should be flexible enough to accommodate cul-
tural variation, as well as for differences in age and socio-
economic status of targeted individuals. The translation
efforts would likely require considerable ingenuity, dedica-
tion, and investment of time and material resources. Yet
failure to undertake them would allow the current waves of
extremism to grow unabated. Given the danger they pose to
world stability and security, countering them head on, based
on the best available science, constitutes a truly global
imperative.
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